Until the end of the 19th century, youth in the United States who were charged with criminal conduct were tried in the same courts as adults, with their age considered relevant mainly to the question of criminal responsibility. Children under age 7 were deemed too young to be held criminally responsible; those between 7 and 14 were presumed not responsible but the prosecution could refute the presumption; and those over 14 were considered equally culpable with adults. Once convicted, youth were subject to the same sentences as adults, including imprisonment, corporal punishment and execution.

Incarcerating young offenders in the same prisons as adults was a deadly mix, leading reformers in New York and Chicago to call for their removal from adult institutions and placement in "Houses of Refuge" and "Reform Schools." By the late 1800's, however, juvenile institutions had become prisons in all but name, and many young people were again jailed with adults. This led to renewed calls for reform.

The first separate court for youth charged with committing criminal acts was established in Illinois in 1899. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 created a special court for neglected, dependent or delinquent children under the age of 16. Among the act's key features were a rehabilitative, rather than punitive, purpose; a provision that juvenile court records be maintained confidentially and separately from criminal records to minimize stigma; the physical separation of youths from adults when incarcerated or placed in the same institution; a provision barring the detention of children under the age of 12 in jails at all; and generally informal procedures.

Although Illinois is the birthplace of the modern juvenile court, much of the intimate, protective and informal character of these proceedings is due to the philosophy and approach of Judge Ben Lindsey, appointed to the Denver bench in 1901. In Judge Lindsey's courtroom, formal rules of procedure and evidence were discarded. Lindsey sought to counsel the children before him, committed to his role as a therapeutic agent for these children. His philosophy was wholeheartedly endorsed by other juvenile court judges of the time, including Judge Julian Mack of Chicago, who declared that what must be determined by the juvenile court judge is not whether "this boy or girl committed a specific wrong ... but what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career."

The juvenile court idea spread rapidly. By 1925, 46 states, three territories and the District of Columbia had created separate juvenile courts. In the mid-1960's, these came under scrutiny for the wide discretion given juvenile court judges, most of whom had no specialized training regarding children, and many of whom were not even lawyers. The "constitutionalization" of the modern juvenile court began at this time, in a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions which imposed certain due process safeguards on the juvenile court. These included Kent v. United States (1966) (holding that youth transferred to adult courts were entitled to a hearing, meaningful representation by counsel, and a statement of reasons for the transfer); In re Gault (1967) (holding that a youth subject to delinquency proceedings has the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, to counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination); In re Winship (1970) (holding that a state must prove a youth guilty of charges beyond a reasonable doubt); and Breed v. Jones (1975) (holding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits states from transferring a youth to adult court after finding him delinquent). However, in 1971, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that youth are not entitled to jury trials in juvenile court.

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